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Weak selection, which means a phenotype is slightly advantageous over another, is an important
limiting case in evolutionary biology. Recently it has been introduced into evolutionary game theory.
In evolutionary game dynamics, the probability to be imitated or to reproduce depends on the
performance in a game. The influence of the game on the stochastic dynamics in finite populations
is governed by the intensity of selection. In many models of both unstructured and structured
populations, a key assumption allowing analytical calculations is weak selection, which means that
all individuals perform approximately equally well. In the weak selection limit many different
microscopic evolutionary models have the same or similar properties. How universal is weak selection
for those microscopic evolutionary processes? We answer this question by investigating the fixation
probability and the average fixation time not only up to linear, but also up to higher orders in
selection intensity. We find universal higher order expansions, which allow a rescaling of the selection
intensity. With this, we can identify specific models which violate (linear) weak selection results,
such as the one–third rule of coordination games in finite but large populations.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 05.40.-a, 02.50.-r
I. INTRODUCTION
In evolutionary game theory the outcome of strategic
situations determines the evolution of different traits in
a population [1]. Typically, individuals are hardwired to
a set of strategies. The performance in an evolutionary
game determines the rate at which strategies spread by
imitation or natural selection. Due to differences in pay-
off, different strategies spread with different rates under
natural selection. In infinitely large well–mixed popula-
tions this is described by the deterministic replicator dy-
namics [2–5]. In this set of non–linear differential equa-
tions the intensity of selection, which determines how
payoff affects fitness, only changes the time scales, but
not the direction of selection or the stability properties.
In finite populations fluctuations cannot be neglected [6–
9]. The dynamics becomes stochastic: Selection drives
the system into the same direction as the correspond-
ing deterministic process, but sometimes the system can
also move into another direction. The strength of selec-
tion determines the interplay between these two forces.
The absence of selective differences is called neutral selec-
tion: Moving into one direction is as probable as moving
into any other, independent of the payoffs. If selection
acts, the transition probabilities become payoff depen-
dent and thus asymmetric. The asymmetry can be the
same in each state (constant selection) or state depen-
dent (frequency dependent selection). In general, un-
der frequency dependent selection the probability that
∗Electronic address: bin.wu@evolbio.mpg.de
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one strategy replaces another can be fairly complicated.
However, under the assumption of weak selection, some
important insights can be obtained analytically [9–16].
It has to be pointed out that these results do in general
not carry over to stronger selection.
Weak selection describes situations in which the effects
of payoff differences are small, such that the evolution-
ary dynamics are mainly driven by random fluctuations.
This approach has a long standing history in population
genetics [17, 18]. In evolutionary biology, a phenotype
is often found to be slightly advantageous over another
phenotype [19, 20]. Further, a recent experiment suggests
that some aspects of weak selection are reflected in hu-
man strategy updating in behavioral games [21]. In the
context of evolutionary game dynamics, however, weak
selection has only recently been introduced by Nowak et
al. [9]. The definition of weak selection is unambiguous
in the case of constant selection, but there are different
ways to introduce such a limit under frequency depen-
dent selection [22].
In the simplest case, frequency dependence can be in-
troduced by an evolutionary game between two types A
and B. In a one shot interaction (where strategies are
played simultaneously) a type A interacting with another
type A receives payoff a, two interacting B types get d
each. Type A interacting with B gets b, whereas B ob-
tains c. This symmetric 2× 2 game can be described by
the payoff matrix
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
. (1)
Let i denote the number of A individuals in a population
of constant size N . Under the assumption of a well-mixed
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population, excluding self–interactions, the average pay-
offs for individuals of either type are given by
piA = a
i− 1
N − 1 + b
N − i
N − 1 , (2)
piB = c
i
N − 1 + d
N − i− 1
N − 1 , (3)
These expectation values are the basis for the evolution-
ary game. In the continuous limit N → ∞, the state of
the system is characterized by the fraction of A individ-
uals x = i/N . The dynamics are typically given by the
replicator dynamics x˙ = x(1−x)(piA−piB), which has the
trivial equilibria xˆ = 0 and xˆ = 1. Additionally, there
can be a third equilibrium between zero and one, given
by x∗ = (d − b)/(a − b − c + d). In finite populations,
the probabilistic description does not allow the existence
of equilibrium points anymore. Moreover, the invariance
of the replicator dynamics under rescaling of the payoff
matrix [5] is lost in finite population models. Typically,
the average payoffs are mapped to the transition proba-
bilities to move from state i to other states, only i = 0
and i = N are absorbing states. When only two types
compete and there is only one reproductive event at a
time this defines a birth–death process. The transition
probabilities from i to i+ 1, and from i to i− 1 are then
denoted by T+i and T
−
i , respectively. They determine
the probability of the process to be absorbed at a cer-
tain boundary, usually called fixation probability, as well
as the average time such an event takes, termed average
fixation time.
An important result of evolutionary game dynamics in
finite populations under weak frequency dependent selec-
tion is the one–third rule. It relates the fixation proba-
bility of a single type A individual, φ1, to the position
of the internal equilibrium x∗ in a coordination game,
i.e. when a > c and d > b. If selection is neutral, we have
φ1 = 1/N . If the internal equilibrium is less than one
third, x∗ < 1/3, then φ1 > 1/N . Originally, this weak se-
lection result has been found for large populations in the
frequency dependent Moran process [9]. Subsequently,
the one–third rule has been derived from several related
birth–death processes [23–25], and also for the frequency
dependent Wright-Fisher process [26, 27], which is still a
Markov process, but no longer a birth-death process. In
a seminal paper, Lessard and Ladret have shown that the
one–third-rule is valid for any process in the domain of
Kingman’s coalescence [28], which captures a huge num-
ber of the stochastic processes typically considered in
population genetics. Essentially, this class of processes
describes situations in which the reproductive success is
not too different between different types. Thus, the gen-
erality of the one–third-rule under linear weak selection
is well established. Here we ask a slightly different ques-
tion: To which order can two birth–death processes be
considered as identical under weak selection? Some au-
thors have considered higher weak selection orders for
specific processes [29–31]. We investigate two classes of
birth–death processes, a general pairwise imitation pro-
cess motivated by social learning and a general Moran
process based on reproductive fitness. In this light, we
also discuss cases which violate the one–third rule.
The manuscript is organized in the following way: In
Sec. II we compute the weak selection expansion of the
fixation probability in a general case of our two classes
of birth–death processes. In Sec. III, we perform the
same calculations for the significantly more complicated
fixation times. In Sec. IV we discuss our analytical results
and conclude. Some detailed calculations can be found
in the Appendix.
II. PROBABILITIES OF FIXATION
A birth–death process is characterized by the tran-
sition probabilities from each state i to its neighboring
states, T+i and T
−
i . We assume that this Markov chain
is irreducible on the interior states and we exclude muta-
tions or spontaneous switching from one type to another.
Thus, the process gets eventually absorbed at i = 0 or
N . For any internal state, the probability to hit i = N
starting from 0 < i < N , φi, fulfills the recursion equa-
tion φi = (1− T+i − T−i )φi + T−i φi−1 + T+i φi+1 [32–34].
This recursion can be solved explicitly, respecting the
boundary conditions φ0 = 0 and φN = 1. For a single A
individual in a populations of B, the probability to take
over the population is [32–34]
φ1 =
1
1 +
∑N−1
k=1
∏k
i=1
T−i
T+i
. (4)
In any model of neutral selection, the transition prob-
abilities of the Markov chain fulfill T−i /T
+
i = 1, and
hence the respective fixation probability of a single mu-
tant amounts to 1/N .
In this section we focus on the weak selection approxi-
mation of Eq. (4). We do this for two different approaches
to evolutionary game theory: imitation dynamics and se-
lection dynamics. In the former case, strategy spreading
is based on pairwise comparison and imitation, in the
latter it results from selection proportional to fitness and
random removal. The most prominent examples are the
Fermi process and the Moran process, respectively.
A. Pairwise comparison
In a pairwise comparison process, two individuals are
chosen randomly to compare their payoffs from the evo-
lutionary game, Eqs. (2) and (3). One switches to the
others strategy with a given probability, see Fig. 1. If se-
lection is neutral, this probability is constant. If selection
acts, the larger the payoff difference, the higher the prob-
ability that the worse imitates the better. But typically
there is also a small chance that the better imitates the
worse. Otherwise, only the strategy of the more success-
ful individual is adopted. This would lead to a dynamics
2
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Im
it
a
ti
o
n
 p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 g
(!
"
)
Payoff difference !"
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
0
1
2
3
4
F
it
n
e
s
s
 f
(!
)
Payoff !
f1(pi) = 1 + βpi
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f2(pi) = exp(βpi)
g3(∆pi) =
{
0 ∆pi ≤ 0
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+ β∆pi
g2(∆pi) =
1
1 + exp(−β∆pi)
FIG. 1: (color online) Upper panel: Pairwise comparison pro-
cesses are characterized by the probability g(∆pi) to imitate
the strategy of someone else based on the payoff difference
∆pi. With increasing payoff difference, the imitation proba-
bility becomes higher, g′(∆pi) ≥ 0. Weak selection implies a
Taylor expansion at ∆pi = 0. Thus, it can only be invoked
for functions that are differentiable in 0. The figure shows
three examples of imitation probability functions, g1(∆pi) is a
linear function (selection intensity β = 0.5) and g2(∆pi) is the
Fermi function (β = 50). For the imitation function g3(∆pi),
a meaningful weak selection limit does not exist since g3(∆pi)
is not differentiable in 0. Because g3(∆pi) = 0 for ∆pi < 0,
the associated stochastic process would be stochastic in time,
but deterministic in direction. All through the manuscript,
we focus on imitation functions that are differentiable in 0.
Lower panel: Moran processes are characterized by a payoff
to fitness mapping f(pi). Fitness is a non–decreasing function
of the payoff, f ′(pi) ≥ 0. The figure shows three examples for
payoff to fitness mappings (selection intensity β = 1 for all
three functions).
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that is stochastic in the time spent in each interior state,
but deterministic in direction [24]. Thus, given that all
interior states are transient, the fixation probabilities are
either 0 or 1 and there is no basis to discuss a weak se-
lection limit.
Selection is parameterized by the intensity of selec-
tion β ≥ 0. As a first example we consider the Fermi
process [24, 35, 36]. Let the two randomly selected in-
dividuals X and Y have payoffs piX and piY . Then X
adopts Y ’s strategy with probability gFermi(piY − piX) =
1/
(
1 + e−β(piY −piX)
)
. Thus, the transition probabilities
of an evolutionary game with payoffs Eqs. (2) and (3)
are given by
T±i =
i
N
N − i
N
1
1 + exp∓β(piA−piB)
. (5)
The probability to stay in state i is 1 − T−i − T+i . The
Fermi process is closely related to Glauber dynamics [37].
If we define individuals’ energy as the exponential func-
tion of payoff, then the Fermi process can be mapped
onto the Ising model. The Fermi process has the com-
fortable property that the ratio of transition probabili-
ties simplifies to T−i /T
+
i = e
−β(piA−piB), such that the
products in Eq. (4) can be replaced by sums in the ex-
ponent. Defining u = (a − b − c + d)/(N − 1) and
v = (Nb−Nd−a+d)/(N−1), such that piA−piB = u i+v,
leads to
φ1(β) =
1
1 +
∑N−1
k=1 exp
{−β [k2 u2 + k(u2 + v)]} . (6)
For large N , the sum can be replaced by an integral,
leading to a closed expression [24]. For weak selection,
Nβ  1, Eq. (6) can be approximated by
φ1 ≈ 1
N
+
(N − 1)((N + 1)u+ 3v)
6N
β. (7)
This can also be obtained directly from T−i /T
+
i ≈ 1 −
β(piA − piB). The fixation probability under weak selec-
tion is greater than in the neutral case if the term linear in
β is positive, Nu+u+3v > 0. In particular, for a coordi-
nation game in a large population, this implies x∗ < 1/3.
Thus, natural selection favors the mutant strategy, if the
invasion barrier is less than one–third, which is the well
known one–third rule [9, 24, 25, 28, 30]. It holds when the
fixation probability in a large but finite population can
be approximated up to linear order in selection intensity.
Can we make general statements based on an expan-
sion of φ1 concerning the probability of switching strate-
gies, g(∆pi)? In a general framework, the probability that
X switches to the strategy of Y , given the difference in
their payoffs, ∆pi = piX − piY , is governed by the inten-
sity of selection. We call g(∆pi) the imitation probability
function of a general pairwise comparison process. In a
well mixed population, the transition probabilities read
T±i =
i
N
N − i
N
g(±β∆pi). (8)
The larger the payoff difference, the more likely the worse
individual switches to the strategy of the better. There-
fore the imitation function is nondecreasing, g′(∆pi) ≥ 0.
Additionally, if the payoffs of the two chosen individuals
are equal, the neutral probability of switching is non-
zero, g(0) > 0 (otherwise, the process does not allow a
3
meaningful definition of weak selection because it would
always deterministically follow the direction of selection).
The fixation probability for this general pairwise compar-
ison process can be expanded to the second order (see
Appendix A 1)
φ1 ≈ 1
N
+ C1β + C2β
2, (9)
where
C1 =
(N − 1) ((N + 1)u+ 3v)
6N
2g′(0)
g(0)
, (10)
and
C2 =
(
u2(N+1)(N+2) + 15uv(N+1) + 30v2
)
(11)
× (N − 1)(N − 2)
360
(
2g′(0)
g(0)
)2
.
C1 is proportional to the increase of the imitation func-
tion at ∆pi = 0, see Fig. 2. Note that for large N , C1 > 0
is equivalent to Nu + 3v > 0, which for large N fur-
ther simplifies to x∗ < 1/3. Thus, the one–third rule
holds for all pairwise comparison processes that fulfill
g′(0) 6= 0, and g(0) > 0. Moreover, C1 is proportional to
2g′(0)/g(0), while C2 is proportional to the square of this
quantity. Thus, 2g′(0)/g(0) can be absorbed into the se-
lection intensity by proper rescaling. Therefore, the more
rapid the increases of the imitation function at ∆pi = 0,
the stronger is the sensitivity of the fixation probability
to changes in average payoff. For low switching proba-
bilities in the neutral case, ∆pi = 0, we have a fixation
probability that changes rapidly when the payoff differ-
ence becomes important, ∆pi 6= 0. While most previous
models have either considered g(0) = 0 (which lies out
of the scope of our approach, because it does not lead to
a reasonable definition of weak selection) or g(0) = 0.5
(which is the default case), some authors have also ex-
plored imitation functions with other values of g(0). For
example, Szabo´ and Hauert have used the imitation func-
tion g(x) = 1/(1 + e−x+α), where α is a constant [38]. In
this case 2g′(0)/g(0) = 2/(1+exp(−α)), thus, an increase
in α is equivalent to an increase in the (small) selection
intensity.
Now it is straightforward to come up with an imitation
function that leads to a violation of the one–third rule,
for example g(∆pi) = 1/(1 + exp{−∆pi3}). Obviously,
g(β∆pi) satisfies the conditions g′(β∆pi) ≥ 0, and g(0) 6=
0. Further, both the first and the second order expansions
vanish. Therefore, the fixation probability under weak
selection can only be approximated as
φ1 ≈ 1
N
+ C3β
3, (12)
where C3 can be derived in the same way as C1 and
C2. In special games, the sign of C3 can also change at
x∗ = 1/3, but in general this will not be the case due to
the complicated dependence of C3 on u and v. In more
general terms, the 1/3 rule is not sustained whenever the
linear approximation of g(β∆pi) vanishes.
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FIG. 2: Approximation of the fixation probability of a single
mutant under weak selection. Upper panel: Pairwise compar-
ison process with the Fermi function 1/(1 + exp[−β∆pi]) as
imitation function. As shown in the main text, up to second
order the approximation is valid for any imitation function
g(β∆pi) after appropriate rescaling of the selection intensity
β. Lower panel: Moran process with fitness as a linear func-
tion of the payoff, f = 1+βpi. Any other function leads to the
same first order approximation after rescaling of β. However,
the second order depends on choice of the function transform-
ing payoff to fitness. Exact analytical results are numerical
evaluations of Eq. (4). (Parameters N = 100, β = 1, a = 4,
b = 1, c = 1, and d = 5 in both panels).
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B. Moran process
In the frequency dependent Moran process the pay-
off pi, given by Eqs. (2) and (3), is mapped to fitness
f , as illustrated in Fig. 1. In each reproductive event,
one individual is selected for reproduction (producing an
identical offspring) proportional to fitness. To keep the
size of the population to the constant value N , a ran-
domly chosen individual is removed from the population
subsequently. As in pairwise comparison processes, the
state i can at most change by one per time step.
In the simplest case, fitness is a linear function of pay-
off. With a background fitness of one, the fitnesses of
4
type A and B read fA = 1 + β piA, and fB = 1 + β piB ,
respectively. The quantity β ≥ 0 serves as the intensity
of selection. Note that β is bound such that fitness never
becomes negative. The probability that the number of A
individuals increases by one, i→ i+ 1, is given by
T+i =
ifA
ifA + (N − i)fB
N − i
N
. (13)
The other possible transition, i → i − 1, occurs with
probability
T−i =
(N − i)fB
ifA + (N − i)fB
i
N
. (14)
When selection is neutral, β = 0, we have T±i = i(N −
i)/N2. Up to linear order in β the Moran process has the
same fixation probability as the Fermi process, Eq. (7),
such that in this approximation the one–third rule is ful-
filled. This is because under first order weak selection,
T−i /T
+
i is again a linear function of the payoff difference.
In general, let fitness be any non-negative function
of the product of payoff and selection intensity, f(βpi),
which fulfills f ′(βpi) ≥ 0. For simplicity, we assume that
the baseline fitness f(0) is one. The transition probabil-
ities in a population with types A and B read
T+i =
if(βpiA)
if(βpiA) + (N − i)f(βpiB)
N − i
N
, (15)
T−i =
(N − i)f(βpiB)
if(βpiA) + (N − i)f(βpiB)
i
N
. (16)
Note that T−i /T
+
i = f(βpiB)/f(βpiA). Up to second or-
der in β, the fixation probability of a single A mutant in
a population of B is (see Appendix A 2)
φ1 ≈ 1
N
+D1 β +D2 β
2, (17)
where
D1 = (N − 1)(N + 1)u+ 3v
6N
f ′(0), (18)
and
D2 =
[
u2(N + 1)(N + 2) + 15uv(N + 1) + 30v2
]
(N − 1)(N − 2)
360
f ′(0)2
−
[
(2a2 + 4ab+ 4cd− 10d2) + (11d2 + 2cd− c2 − 3b2 − 6ab− 3a2)N
+ (a2 + 2ab+ 3b2 − c2 − 2cd− 3d2)N2
]
(N − 1)
24N3
(
f ′(0)2 − f ′′(0)) ,
(19)
with u and v as above. Note that the first order term
depends on payoff differences only, but the second or-
der term also depends on the payoff values directly. An
example for such an approximation is shown in Fig. 2.
The first order term D1 is proportional to the increase
in fitness at pi = 0, f ′(0). The first order term D1 is
proportional to Nu + 3v for large N . Hence, the one–
third rule holds for every Moran model for which f ′(0)
does not vanish under weak selection. Additionally, f ′(0)
can be absorbed into the selection intensity by rescaling:
Changing this rate is equivalent to changing the inten-
sity of selection. Note that this is not possible with D2,
where not only the slope, but also the curvature of the
fitness function at the origin plays a role. However, when
the exponential fitness function f = exp(βpi) is employed
[39], the second term of Eq. (19) vanishes. This allows
to incorporate f ′(0) into the selection intensity even for
the second order term.
Again, we conclude the section with an example where
the one–third is violated. Consider the fitness function
f(βpi) = 1+β3pi3, which obviously satisfies f(0) = 1, and
f ′(βpi) ≥ 0. Both, first and second order correction in
β vanish, D1 = D2 = 0. Therefore, the first non-trivial
approximation of the fixation probability is
φ1 ≈ 1
N
+D3 β
3. (20)
If D3 changes sign at x
∗ = 1/3, we recover the one–third
rule. This is only the case for very special games. In
analogy to the previous section, the general one–third
rule does not hold anymore.
III. TIMES OF FIXATION
In this section we address the conditional fixation time
τAi . In a finite population of N − i individuals of type
B and i individuals of type A, τAi measures the ex-
pected number of imitation or birth–death events until
the population consist of type A only, under the con-
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dition that this event occurs. In general, the probabil-
ity PAi (t) that after exactly t events the process moved
from any i to N , which is the all A state, obeys the
master equation PAi (t) =
(
1− T+i − T−i
)
PAi (t − 1) +
T−i P
A
i−1(t − 1) + T+i PAi+1(t − 1). The average fixation
time τAi =
∑∞
t=0 t P
A
i (t)/φi is the stationary first mo-
ment of this probability distribution, resulting from a
recursive solution of φi τ
A
i =
(
1− T+i − T−i
)
φi τ
A
i +
T−i φi−1(τ
A
i−1 + 1) + T
+
i φi+1(τ
A
i+1 + 1). In a similar way
one can find τBi =
∑∞
t=0 t P
B
i (t)/(1 − φi), such that the
total average lifetime of the Markov process amounts to
φiτ
A
i + (1 − φi)τBi [32, 40, 41]. Following the previous
section we restrict our analysis to the biologically most
relevant case i = 1, which yields [32, 40]
τA1 =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
φl
T+l
k∏
m=l+1
T−m
T+m
. (21)
Maruyama and Kimura [42], Antal and Scheuring [41]
as well as Taylor et al. [43] have shown that the condi-
tional fixation time of a single mutant of either type is
the same, τA1 = τ
B
N−1. This remarkable identity holds for
any evolutionary birth–death process, and is thus valid
for any 2× 2 game and for any selection intensity. How-
ever, for j > 1 we have τAj 6= τBN−j , unless β vanishes.
Since τA1 and τ
B
N−1 are identical up to any order in β, we
obtain [
∂n
∂βn
τA1
]
β=0
=
[
∂n
∂βn
τBN−1
]
β=0
(22)
for any n. This symmetry can help to obtain several
properties of the expansion of the conditional fixation
time, Eq. (21), without brute force calculations.
A. Pairwise comparison
Let us first consider the fixation time in the special case
of the Fermi process, Eq. (5). When the selection inten-
sity vanishes, β = 0, we have τA1 (0) = 2N(N−1), [13, 33].
When selection is weak, N β  1, the conditional fixa-
tion time is approximately τA1 ≈ τA1 (0)+∂βτA1 (β)|β=0 β+
∂2βτ
A
1 (β)|β=0 β2/2. For the Fermi process, the first order
term is then given by [13][
∂
∂β
τA1
]
β=0
= −uN(N − 1)N
2 +N − 6
18
, (23)
where u stems from piA − piB = u i + v, compare App.
II A. The first order expansion of τA1 is only proportional
to the i dependent term u in this special case. This can
also be seen from a symmetry argument [41, 43]: Since
τA1 = τ
B
N−1, the fixation time does not change under
a ↔ d and b ↔ c. Since u, but not v, is invariant under
this exchange of strategy names, τA1 can depend under
linear weak selection only on u, but not on v. The second
order term of the conditional fixation time for the Fermi
process yields[
d2
dβ2
τA1
]
β=0
= E1 u
2 + E2 uv + E3 v
2, (24)
where
E1 =− (N−2)(N−1)N
5400
(180− 122N + 177N2 + 59N3),
E2 =− N
2(6− 7N +N3)
18
, (25)
E3 =
1
N
E2.
Now, in contrast to the first order expansion Eq. (23),
both u and v enter. An interesting relation is E3 =
E2/N . In the following, we show that this is found for
any pairwise comparison process and not only in the spe-
cial case of the Fermi process.
For general pairwise comparison processes under neu-
tral selection, the conditional fixation time is τA1 (0) =
N(N − 1)/g(0), where g(0) > 0. When selection acts,
Eq. (8), the transition probabilities become dependent
on the derivative of the imitation function, g′(0) ≥ 0.
We are now interested in the imitation function’s influ-
ence on the first and second order terms in β. In general,
the first order term in β reads
∂
∂β
τA1 =
∑
|α|=1
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
hα, (26)
hα =
(
∂α1
∂βα1
1
T+i
)(
∂α2
∂βα2
φl
)(
∂α3
∂βα3
k∏
m=l+1
T−m
T+m
)
(27)
with the multi–index α = (α1, α2, α3), |α| = α1+α2+α3,
see App. B 1 for details of the calculation. The general
structure of this term is determined by hα, which is lin-
ear in u and v, as |α| equals one. Thus, ∂βτA1 |β=0 =
F1 u+F2 v is also of this form, where F1 and F2 only de-
pend on the population size N . With the same symmetry
argument as above, based on [41, 43], we can conclude
that F2 = 0. This yields
τA1 = τ
B
N−1 ≈
N(N − 1)
g(0)
+ F1 uβ. (28)
We can now calculate the payoff independent term F1 for
any g(∆pi) from the special case u = 1 and v = 0, which
reads
F1 = − g
′(0)
g(0)2
N(N − 1)N
2 +N − 6
18
. (29)
Here, β can be rescaled by g′(0)/g(0)2. Changing g′(0) or
g(0) is equivalent to changing the selection intensity ap-
propriately. In particular, when u > 0, which is true e.g.
for coordination games such as the stag–hunt game [44],
the conditional time it takes on average for a mutant
6
type to take over decreases with the intensity of selec-
tion. Moreover, for a > c and b > d in combination with
u < 0, a mutant which is always advantageous over the
wild type needs longer to reach fixation than a neutral
mutant. This phenomenon, termed stochastic slowdown
in [45], occurs in any imitation process, since Eq. (28)
only depends on u.
For the second order term in the expansion in β we can
write
∂2
∂β2
τA1 =
∑
|α|=2
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
hα, (30)
hα is of the form G1 u
2 +G2 uv+G3 v
2. Thus ∂2βτ
A
1 |β=0
is also of this form, where the Gi’s only depend on N .
Again, we consider the transformation a ↔ d and b ↔ c
which corresponds to exchanging the names of the strate-
gies. For the transformed game, we obtain ∂2βτ
B
N−1|β=0 =
G1 u
2+G2 uv˜+G3 v˜
2 with v˜ = (Nc−Na−d+a)/(N−1).
Using Eq. (22), we obtain G2 u(v− v˜) +G3 (v2− v˜2) = 0.
With v + v˜ = −N u, we then get G3 = G2/N — the
symmetry discussed above for a special case holds for any
imitation function. Eventually, the second order term in
β for general imitation probability is given by
∂2
∂β2
τA1 = G1u
2 +G2uv +
G2
N
v2, (31)
The special cases u = 1, v = 0, as well as u = 0, v = 1
allow to compute G1 and G2 explicitly. Thus we have
(see Appendix B 1)
G1 =− (N − 2)(N − 1)N
5400
(180− 122N + 177N2 + 59N3)
(
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
)
− N
2(N − 1)(2N − 1)
6
(
g′′(0)
g(0)2
)
, (32)
G2 =− N
2(6− 7N +N3)
18
(
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
)
−N2(N − 1)g
′′(0)
g(0)2
. (33)
Obviously, Eq.(31) does not allow a rescaling of the inten-
sity of selection. Instead, the properties of the imitation
function enter in a more intricate way. An example of
this approximation is shown in Fig. 3.
B. Moran process
To close this section, we consider the Moran process,
where selection at birth is proportional to fitness and
selection at death is random. For neutral selection β = 0,
it is well known that τA1 (0) = N(N−1) [13, 33, 41]. When
selection is weak β  1, the conditional mean fixation
time is approximately τA1 ≈ τA1 (0) +∂βτA1 |β=0 β. For the
Moran process with linear fitness function, fA = 1+βpiA,
we have ∂βτ
A
1 |β=0 = −uN2(N2 − 3N + 2)/36, compare
[13, 43]. The first order expansion of τA1 again depends
only on u, but not on v. This can be shown based on
[41, 43] or explicitly [13].
With general fitness mapping f(βpi) with transition
rates (15) and (16), we have[
∂
∂β
τA1 (β)
]
β=0
= −f ′(0)N2N
2 − 3N + 2
36
u, (34)
which allows a rescaling of the intensity of selection when
τA1 is approximated up to linear order.
With general fitness function f(x), it becomes un-
wieldy to calculate higher order terms in β. However,
the general calculations are similar to that of the general
pairwise comparison rules. Eq. (19) reveals that already
the second order expansion of the fixation probability φ1
with general fitness mapping is tedious in form. Thus
the equivalent terms for the fixation time τA1 are even
more complicated and do not lead to further insight in
this case. Since it would be only an academic exercise
to calculate them, we do not give them explicitly here.
It is clear that the weak selection approximation is not
universal over a large class of processes in second order
in the fixation times.
IV. DISCUSSION
In the past years, weak selection has become an impor-
tant approximation in evolutionary game theory [9–15].
Weak selection means that the game has only a small
influence on evolutionary dynamics. In evolutionary bi-
ology and population genetics, the idea that most muta-
tions confer small selective differences is widely accepted.
In social learning models, it refers to a case where imita-
tion is mostly random, but there is a tendency to imitate
others that are more successful. Since weak selection is
the basis of many recent results in evolutionary dynam-
ics [10, 11, 46–48], it is of interest how universal these
results are. It has been shown that they are remarkably
robust and the choice of evolutionary dynamics has only
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FIG. 3: Weak selection approximation of the conditional fix-
ation time of a single mutant, the exact result is given by
Eq. (21). Upper panel: The approximations are shown for
the Fermi process, but they would be identical up to second
order for any other pairwise comparison process after appro-
priate rescaling of the selection intensity. Lower panel: For
any Moran process the first order approximation is indepen-
dent of the precise function mapping payoff to fitness (here
it is linear). Any higher order approximation depends on the
details of the function. Note that the first order approxima-
tion in the two panels is not identical due to a difference in
the dependence on population size N (same parameters as in
Fig. 2)
10
FIG. 3: Weak selection approximation of the conditional fix-
ation time of a single mutant, the exact result is given by
Eq. (21). Upp r panel: The approximations are show for
the Fermi proce s, but they would b identical up to seco d
order for any other pairwise com arison pr ce s after appro-
priate rescaling of the selection intensity. Lower panel: F r
any Moran process the first order approximation is indepen-
dent of the precise function mapping payoff to fitness (here
it is linear). Any higher order approximation depends on the
details of the function. Note that the first order approxima-
tion in the two panels is not identical due to a difference in
the dependence on population size N (same parameters as in
Fig. 2)
a small impact in unstructured populations [28, 49]. In
structured populations, however, the choice of evolution-
ary dynamics can have a crucial impact on the outcome
[11, 47, 50–54]. For example, for a prisoner’s dilemma
on a graph under weak selection, cooperation may be fa-
vored by a death birth process while it is never favored by
a birth death process. In a well mixed population, how-
ever, the transition probabilities for those two processes
are identical, thus they lead to the same result. However,
in general spatial structure has a less pronounced effect
under weak selection than under strong selection [53, 54].
We have addressed to what extent two evolutionary
processes can be considered as identical by investigat-
ing the fixation probability and the fixation time. For
any given 2 × 2 payoff matrix, we have considered two
classes of evolutionary processes: Pairwise comparison
and Moran processes. An interesting special case is the
Moran process with exponential fitness mapping, which
is equivalent to the Fermi process (a special case of the
pairwise comparison rule) in terms of fixation probabili-
ties.
For the fixation probability, the first order term in the
selection intensity always has the same form, given that it
does not vanish. In addition, regardless of the choice of
imitation functions, two pairwise comparison processes
are always identical up to second order weak selection
in the fixation probabilities. For Moran processes, an
equivalent statement does not hold. Recently, a paper
has shown that in 3× 3 games under weak selection, the
Fermi update rule can be quite different from the Moran
process and the local update rule (an imitation process
with linear imitation function [23]), while the Moran pro-
cess and the local update rule are more similar to each
other [55]. Our result shows that for weak selection in
2 × 2 games, these three processes can be mapped to
each other by an appropriate rescaling of the intensity of
selection.
For the first order approximation of the average fix-
ation time, there are differences in the dependence on
the system size, but all processes depend on the game in
the same way. This follows from a symmetry in fixation
times [41, 43]. For higher orders in the intensity of se-
lection, a simple rescaling of the selection intensity does
not exist for the fixation times and a general statement
on the relation between two processes cannot be made.
The robustness of weak selection results, i.e. the in-
variance to changes of the underlying stochastic process,
found in the linear approximation is remarkable, but fol-
lows from basic assumptions on evolutionary dynamics.
Moreover, the universality of weak selection breaks down
when higher order terms are discussed.
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Appendix A: Third order expansion of the fixation probabilities
Here, we expand the fixation probability φ1 for general birth–death processes up to the third order. Let γi = T
−
i /T
+
i
and
[
∂s
∂βs
γi
]
β=0
= psi. (A1)
Note that the first index of psi refers to the order of the derivative and the second index gives the position in state
space. We expand Eq.(4) to the third order under weak selection γi ≈ 1 + p1iβ + p2iβ2/2 + p3iβ3/6. Hence, we have
k∏
i=1
γi ≈ 1 +
k∑
j=1
p1j︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1k
β +
 k∑
j=1
(p2j − p21j) +
 k∑
j=1
p1j
2

︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2k
β2
2
+
 k∑
j=1
p3j + 3
 k∑
j=1
p1j
( k∑
s=1
p2s
)
− 3
k∑
j=1
p1jp2j

︸ ︷︷ ︸
L3k
β3
6
. (A2)
Then the fixation probability can be written as
φ1 ≈
N + β
N−1∑
k=1
L1k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q1
+
β2
2
N−1∑
k=1
L2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q2
+
β3
6
N−1∑
k=1
L3k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q3

−1
(A3)
≈ 1
N
− Q1
N2
β +
[
Q21
N3
− Q2
2N2
]
β2 −
[
Q31
N4
− Q1Q2
N3
+
Q3
6N2
]
β3. (A4)
This now serves as a starting point for our particular processes with certain choices of γi = T
−
i /T
+
i and particular
psi resulting from this.
1. General pairwise comparison process
For general switching probabilities in a pairwise comparison process, we have
p1i = −2g
′(0)
g(0)
∆pii, (A5)
p2i =
(
2g′(0)
g(0)
∆pii
)2
(A6)
p3i = −26(g
′(0))3 − 3g(0)g′(0)g′′(0) + g(0)2g′′′(0)
g(0)3
(∆pii)
3. (A7)
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Inserting these quantities into Eqs.(A2) and (A3) leads to
Q1 = −2g
′(0)
g(0)
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
i=1
∆pii, (A8)
Q2 =
(
2g′(0)
g(0)
)2 N−1∑
k=1
(
k∑
i=1
∆pii
)2
, (A9)
Q3 = 2
6(g′(0))3 + 3g(0)g′(0)g′′(0)− g(0)2g′′′(0)
g(0)3
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
i=1
(∆pii)
3
− 24(g
′(0))3
g(0)3
N−1∑
k=1
(
k∑
i=1
∆pii
)(
k∑
s=1
(∆pis)
2
)
. (A10)
Q1 and Q2 have been calculated in the main text. Note that they only depend on g
′(0)/g(0), whereas Q3 also depends
on higher order derivatives of the imitation function. Thus, two pairwise comparison processes that are identical in
first order are also identical in second order. Only in third order, differences start to emerge.
Let us briefly come back to our example of an imitation function that violates the 1/3-rule, g(x) = (1+exp(−x3))−1.
In this case, we have g(0) = 1/2, g′(0) = g′′(0) = 0 and g′′′(0) = 3/2. Thus, both Q1, and Q2 vanish and the third
order expansion of the fixation probability is
φ1 ≈ 1
N
+
N − 1
60N
[
(N + 1)(3N2 − 2)u3 + 15(N + 1)Nu2v + 30(N + 1)uv2 + 30v3]β3. (A11)
2. Moran processes
For Moran processes with general fitness functions, we have p1i = −f ′(0)∆pii and p2i = 2(f ′(0))2piA∆pii−f ′′(0)(piA+
piB)∆pii. Inserting these quantities into Eqs.(A2) and (A3) leads to
Q1 = −f ′(0)
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
i=1
∆pii,
Q2 =
(
(f ′(0))2 − f ′′(0))N−1∑
k=1
k∑
i=1
(pi2A − pi2B) + (f ′(0))2
N−1∑
k=1
(
k∑
i=1
∆pii
)2
. (A12)
Thus, the first and the second order expansion of the fixation probability of such processes are given by Eqs.(18) and
(19), respectively. In particular for f(pi) = 1 + pi3, both p1i and p2i vanish and p3i = −6(pi3A − pi3B). By Eq.(A3), this
yields
φ1 =
1
N
+
1
N2
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
i=1
(pi3A − pi3B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D3
β3 + o(β3) (A13)
where D3 =
1
60N(N−1)2
(
− 3c2d(N − 2)(1 +N)(2N − 1)− 3cd2(N − 2)(N + 1)(3N − 4) + 6a2b(N − 2)(N2− 2N + 2) +
a(a2 + 3b2)(N − 2)(3N2− 6N + 1)− c3(1 +N)(3N2− 2) + 2b3(1 +N − 9N2 + 6N3)− d3(N − 2)(29− 39N + 12N2)
)
.
Appendix B: Times of fixation
General expressions for the first and second order expansion of the fixation time for the birth–death process have
been given in Eq(26) and Eq.(30). Based on these, we show the results for the general pairwise comparison rule first
and then discuss the Moran process.
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1. General pairwise comparison process
For the first order term of the fixation time, Eq.(26), each hα on the rhs. is proportional to g
′(0)/g2(0). Thus, the
first order term of the fixation time is of the form Rg′(0)/g2(0). In particular, when g(∆pi) is the Fermi function,
g′(0)/g2(0) is one. Hence the first order of the fixation time for the Fermi process is R, cf. Eq.(23). This leads to the
first order expansion of the fixation time for general pairwise comparison rule, Eq.(29).
For the second order, we write Eq. (30) explicitly as
∂2
∂β2
τA1 =
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
h(2,0,0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
+
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
h(0,2,0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
K2
+
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
h(0,0,2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
K3
+ 2
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
h(1,1,0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
K4
+ 2
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
h(1,0,1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
K5
+ 2
N−1∑
k=1
k∑
l=1
h(0,1,1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
K6
. (B1)
As shown in the main text, the second order term is of the form of G1u
2 + G2uv +
G2
N v
2. Letting u = 1 and v = 0
leads to
K1 =
N2(N − 1)(2N − 1)
6
2(g′(0))2 − g(0)g′′(0)
g(0)3
K2 = −N
2(N − 2)(N − 1)(17 + 63N + 16N2)
2700
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
K3 =
N(−120 + 4N + 350N2 − 65N3 − 290N4 + 121N5)
1800
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
K4 = −N
3(N2 − 1)
12
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
K5 =
N3(2− 3N +N2)
9
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
K6 = −N
2(2 + 25N − 15N2 − 25N3 + 13N4)
180
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
(B2)
after some tedious calculations using the identity
∑M
k=1
∑k
l=1 =
∑M
l=1
∑M
k=l[56]. Summing these Ki’s leads to G1 in
Eq.(32). On the other hand, letting u = 0 and v = 1 yields
K1 = N(N − 1)2(g
′(0))2 − g(0)g′′(0)
g(0)3
K2 =
N2(N − 1)(N − 2)
18
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
K3 =
N(4N3 − 15N2 + 17N − 6)
18
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
K4 = −N
2(N − 1)
2
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
K5 =
N(N − 1)(N − 2)
2
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
K6 = −N
2(N − 1)(N − 2)
3
2(g′(0))2
g(0)3
(B3)
Adding these Ki’s yields G2/N as in Eq. (33). Thus, the quantities in Eq. (31) are finally derived.
2. Moran processes
For Moran processes, the approach is fully equivalent to pairwise comparison processes. However, the results do
not only depend on payoff differences u and v, but on the full payoff matrix with entries a, b, c, and d. This makes
11
the calculations a matter of diligence and leads to quite long expressions, but not to additional insights. Thus, we do
not give details of the derivation here.
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